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Abstract
We suggest that foreign banks may represent a trade-oﬀ for their de-
veloping country hosts. A portfolio model is developed to show that a
more diversiﬁed international bank may be one of lower overall risk and
less susceptible to funding shocks but may react more to shocks that aﬀect
expected returns in a particular host country. Foreign banks have become
particularly important in Latin America where we ﬁnd strong support for
these theoretical predictions using a dataset of individual Latin Ameri-
can banks in eleven countries. Moreover, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the size of the response of foreign banks to a negative liquidity
shock and a positive opportunity shock: in both cases the market share
of foreign banks in credit increases.
Keywords: Foreign Banks, Credit Volatility, Portfolio Choice, Inter-
national Financial Markets
JEL Codes: G11, G15, G21
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Foreign banks play an extremely important role in developing economies. Refer-
ing to BIS data foreign banks, through direct lending and through their local
∗We are grateful to Kevin Cowan, Linda Goldberg, Stephen Kay, Ugo Panizza and to the
participants of the conference "Rethinking Structural Reform In Latin America" held at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in October 2003, and to participants at the Inter-American
Development Bank’s policy seminar, for useful comments and discussion . We also thank Ana
Maria Loboguerrero for excellent research assistance. The opinions in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Inter-American Development Bank.
1subsidiaries and branches, had lent some US$1.6 trillion as of December 20031.
To put this in context, Martinez Peria, Powell and Vladkova (2003) calculate
that BIS reporting banks account for some 31% of total domestic credit in the
developing world and for more than 50% of domestic credit in Latin America
and Eastern Europe. Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2002) highlight the dra-
matic increase in the foreign ownership of local banks noting that foreign banks
control majority market shares in nearly all of the larger Latin American ﬁnan-
cial markets - exceptions being Brazil and Colombia. In this paper, we employ
a dataset covering ﬁnancial institutions (foreign owned and their national com-
petitors) in Latin America2. This data suggests that some 42% of domestic
credit from private banks to the private sector is accounted for by the branches
and subsidiaries3 of foreign banks in the region ranging from a low of 6% in El
Salvador to 65% in Mexico4.
Given the rise in importance of foreign banks, a lively debate has developed
focusing on whether foreign banks imply greater stability in credit intermedia-
tion. In favor of greater stability is the idea that internationally active banks
from G10 countries, through their global reach and diversiﬁcation may have
lower default risks and lower funding costs, and be less prone to shocks in the
costs of funding from a particular country - including the extreme case of depos-
itor runs. However, there is also a view that foreign banks may bring instability.
In particular, and the focus of this paper, is the idea that they may be more
ﬁckle than domestic lenders5.F i c k l ei sd e ﬁned here as being more sensitive to
opportunity shocks (shocks to expected returns) in the host countries in which
they operate. In the extreme they may pack up and leave6.
In this paper, we employ a portfolio model of banking as developed by Pyle
(1971)7. This type of model has been used to illustrate a number of results.
1The BIS data refers to BIS reporting bank claims on developing countries including both
loans and securities and is the addition of international claims (ie: cross border lending plus
local lending in foreign currency) and local claims in local currency. The ﬁgure does not
include oﬀshore centers including Hong Kong. See Bank of International Settlements (2004)
2We therefore capture all local lending in foreign and local currency. We do not consider
direct lending from the foreign parent to local companies.
3For convenience we will use the word subsidiary but hereafter this is understood to include
both subsidiaries and branches. Our deﬁnition of a subsidiary is a local entity where more
than 50% of the ownership is accounted for by a single parent ﬁnancial institution from a G10
country. We do not elaborate here on the diﬀerences between the two legal forms; subsidiaries
and branches.
4In pre-crisis Argentina, the ﬁgure was higher at some 72%.
5Foreign banks may also import instability from their home countries or from other coun-
tries where they operate. Previous papers on these issues include Crystal et al (2002), Dages
et al. (2000), Goldberg (2001), Haas and van Lelyveld (2003), Martinez Peria, Powell and
Vladkova (2003), Peek and Rosengren (2000a, 2000b) and van Ricjkeghem and Weder (2000).
Several of these papers suggest that while foreign banks may import instability, they may also
stabilize credit during a negative shock in the host country. Our results suggest that that this
depends on the nature of that shock.
6In the case of the Argentine crisis, 3 international banks did precisely that: Scotia Bank
of Canada, Credit Agrcole of France and Intesa of Italy withdrew in one form or another.
However, it should be noted that the larger foreign players did not withdraw, and indeed put
in more capital during 2002.
7See also Hart and Jaﬀee (1974), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992). Freixas
2First, an unregulated bank with a wider universe of potential assets will have
a lower probability of default for a given required rate of return on capital or
a greater expected return for the same probability of default. Second, in the
case of a regulated bank, where Basel I type risk weights bind, a bank with a
wider universe of potential assets may or may not be a less risky bank (Kim
and Santomero 1988). The potential perverse result comes from the Basel I
c o n s t a n tr i s kw e i g h t sa c r o s sa s s e t so fd i ﬀerent risks8 and the incentive to invest
in riskier, higher expected-return assets and divest those assets where the capital
requirement does not bind. Third, if the bank takes its own limited liability into
account, Rochet (1992) shows that a bank with higher capital levels will be a
safer bank9. With limited liability, the option like nature of the returns implies
a decrease in the incentives to take risk as bank capital rises10.T h i s r e s u l t
provides an additional argument, over and above diversiﬁcation, why a larger
international bank may be a “safer” bank. In what follows, we will work with
a relatively simple portfolio approach, but still one capable of illustrating the
main trade-oﬀs that are the focus of the paper11.
However, we also use the portfolio model to show that when banks are more
diversiﬁed across nations, and suﬀer a shock to expected returns in a particu-
lar host country, they may cut back on local lending more rapidly than a less
diversiﬁed (national) bank. The result mirrors that of Calvo (1998) on the glob-
alization of mutual funds. The Calvo (1988) paper was extended by Calvo and
Mendoza (2000a) to a model with imperfect information and this is also dis-
cussed in Calvo and Mendoza (2000b). We work here with the full-information
version of the model12, but whereas Calvo considers only assets, and the case
of independent asset returns, we extend the basic model to include liabilities as
well and consider correlated asset returns and funding costs across countries.
The theory suggests that the presence of international banks represents a trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, diversiﬁcation may lead to greater sensitivity to expected
return (opportunity) shocks. On the other hand, diversiﬁcation of risk is likely
to lead to safer banks with lower funding costs and moreover shocks to funding
costs in a particular host country may lead to reduced eﬀects on credit interme-
and Rochet (1999) provides an excellent review.
8Basel I does employ diﬀerent risk weights for categories of assets. However the categories
are very broad and in particular uncollateralized coporate lending attracts an 8% capital
requirement irrespective of the risk of the company.
9Indeed, the author argues that higher levels of capital rather than just risk-related capital
may be required to reduce default probabilities eﬃciently.
10This is equivalent to the result that a theta of a call option falls as the option is further
out of the money.
11We present results assuming a Basel I type minimum capital regulation but our main
results would also follow for an unregulated bank or one where the Basel capital constraint does
not bind. As our results do not depend on changes in the dispersion of the distributions but
only on shocks to expected values, our results would be largely unchanged by the introduction
of risk related capital rules such as those proposed for Basel II. We also work with the non
perverse case where the diversiﬁcation eﬀect of a wider universe of assets dominates the
possiblity of arbitraging Basel I rules as in the KS perverse case.
12This implies an assumption that there is a shock to expected returns or funding costs
with no updating of the assumed variances and covariances.
3diation in the host. However, the model also suggests various nuances to this
tradeoﬀ.
International banks must comply with local capital regulations as well as
the capital regulations of their main or lead supervisors on their consolidated
balance sheets. However, if capital in a host country is recognised by the home
regulator at the level of the international (consolidated) bank, it is unlikely that
this will result in further restrictions. Moreover, a host country regulator may
recognise long term liabilities of the subsidiary held by the parent as capital.
An international bank generally then has ﬂexibility in how to satisfy the set of
capital requirements that it is normally subject to. Potentially more important
are restrictions on the use of local deposit funding. Several countries attempt
to restrict the use of banks’ local funding. Argentina provides a case in point
where, by law, local deposits may only be used to fund local assets13.T h i s
represents a set of extra restrictions on the asset allocation of international
banks and we explore the implications on the basic trade-oﬀ outlined above.
In the third section of the paper we turn to the empirical evidence. We
employ a rich dataset of quarterly data on individual banks from 1993 - 2002,
across eleven countries in Latin America. This yields over 3500 observations
with considerable time and cross-section variation and contsitutes the largest
dataset at the individual bank level that we are aware of that has been used
to analyze these issues. We ﬁrst consider descriptive statistics to illustrate the
role of foreign banks in the region and then turn to a more formal statistical
and econometric analysis. The use of standard regression techniques to analyze
credit is problematic due to issues of variable endogeneity and identiﬁcation.
However the predictions of the theoretical model suggest an innovative way for-
ward in this case. In particular, we identify periods of funding and opportunity
shocks in the eleven countries over time using aggregate movements in deposits
and credit. We then test whether foreign banks behave diﬀerently to national
banks during these diﬀerent episodes. We ﬁnd support for the theory suggest-
ing that indeed foreign banks may indeed represent a trade-oﬀ for their hosts.
Section four concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications.
2 A simple model of an international bank
The model presented is formally similar to that of Pyle (1971) but we extend
the basic model to J countries with deposits and assets in each. Let us assume
that a bank chooses a loan portfolio in each country that can be represented
simply by an expected return and a variance. For simplicity we will consider
assets with normal distributions. Given this asset portfolio, we assume that the
bank must seek funding through own capital and deposits. We assume the bank
pays the market deposit rate of the country concerned. We assume that the loan
portfolio is of a longer maturity than deposits, that must then be rolled over
13The only foreign assets banks may purchase, funded by local deposits, are those authorized
by the central bank and consistent with liquidity regulations.
4at market rates, or equivalently that the bank contracts deposits at a variable
interest rate. Deposit contracts are then also summarized by an expected cost
and a variance. Below we ﬁrst derive some analytical results and then illustrate
them by means of simulations.
We normalize the capital of the bank to 1 and assume risk aversion with
mean-variance type preferences. First consider a symmetric case. The bank
raises a total of D deposits, the expected return on all country loans is equal to
ρr the expected deposit rate in all countries is ρD. If the standard deviation of
all loan returns and deposit rates to be paid is equal to σ and all covariances
between countries are equal to COV 14 and the covariance between the loan
rate and the deposit rate within a country is COVLD, then the bank would
raise D/J deposits in each country and invest (1 + D)/J in each country. The
expected return, µ, and the variance, VA R , of the bank’s return may then be
written as:














respectively. It is easy to check that as J increases, the variance decreases15
and as J tends to inﬁnity, the variance of the portfolio tends to COV,t h e
covariance of returns on assets and of deposit rates across the J diﬀerent coun-
tries. This mirrors the standard result in portfolio theory that the risk of a
well-diversiﬁed portfolio is the systemic risk represented by the correlations of
asset returns. Note that in this symmetric case, the same result follows if we
add a Basel I capital constraint that might be written as:
J X
j=1
αjL ≤ K (3)
where L are loans, αj the Basel 1 risk weight, K capital and the j subscripts
are for country j. In this simple symmetric case, where the α i st h es a m ef o r
each country’s asset, capital is normalized to unity, and a bank invests (1+D)/J
in each country this reduces to:
14In other words the covariances between loan returns in country i and j, between funding
costs in country i and j and between a loan return in country i and a funding cost in country
ja r ee q u a lt oCOV.
15This true for COV
σ2 < 1 and COVLD
σ2 < 1 or in other words when betas are on average
less than one, a standard condition that diversiﬁcation leads to lower risk.
5α(1 + D) ≤ 1 (4)
Maximizing a mean-variance type utility function subject to this constraint
with the symmetric expected returns and variances results in a portfolio of equal
shares across countries and hence the same result: that risk will decline with
greater diversiﬁcation across countries.
However, globalization may also make investors more ﬁckle. Following Calvo
(1998) we call the ﬁrst country the “host”, let all countries be symmetric in terms
of variances and covariances, but allow the host country to suﬀer a change in
expected returns (opportunity shocks) and a change in deposit rates (funding
shocks). As before, let the international bank invest (1 + D) in risky assets
around the globe in J diﬀerent countries and fund these assets by raising D
deposits and capital normalized to unity. Let the bank invest θ in the J − 1
countries excluding the “host” and (1 − θ) in the host country. Let the bank
raise (1 − η) deposits in the host country and η in the other J − 1 countries.
Let the expected return on loans in the host country be sL and the expected
cost of deposits in the host country be sD. We set all the covariances between
diﬀerent country asset returns and between diﬀe r e n tc o u n t r yd e p o s i tr a t e st o
be the same and equal to COV 16 and the covariance between asset returns and
deposit rates within a country to be equal to COVLD. The expected return
and the variance of the return of the bank can then be written as:
µ =( 1+D)(θρr +( 1− θ)sr) − D(ηρd +( 1− η)sD) (5)



























+ D(1 + D)(1 − θ)(1 − η)
¾
Assuming a Basel 1 type capital requirement, the maximization problem
faced by the bank can then be represented as17:
16In this case, for simplicity, we set each covariance between the loan return in country i
and the funding cost in country j to be zero.
17We assume the Basel 1 capital constraint binds and that 0 <θ<1,0 <η<1.T h i s
implies a set of restrictions on the parameters and most obviously that ρL,sL > ρD,sD.
Indeed following Pyle we could present the model without diﬀerentiating between assets and
deposits except by their expected returns and have banks endogenously determining to "short









subject to (1 + D) ≤ 1 (7)
If the capital constraint is satisﬁed at equality this yields a solution for θ






α[(1 − β)(sL − ρL) − β2(sD − ρD)]
γσ2 ¡






Where β = COV/σ2 and β2 = COVLD/σ2. The solution has some
intuitive properties. We will assume 0 ≤ β,β2 ≤ 1 and that (1 − β)2 >β
2
2.
Then, as the expected return in the host, sL, increases, θ declines and the bank
will shift out of the other countries and into the host. In general, if funding
costs in the host, sD, rise the bank will shift out of the host and into other
countries - θ is increased. However, if β2 =0(zero covariance between local
funding costs and the return on the local asset), then the solution does not
depend on expected funding costs and the investment decision is separate from









- the Calvo (1998) case. And if ρL = sL and ρD = sD
(there is no diﬀerence between the host country expected returns and funding
costs), then solution reduces to θ = J−1
J a n dw ea r eb a c kt ot h es y m m e t r i c
case. However, taking the derivative with respect to the expected return, sL,
to investigate how the optimal portfolio changes given an opportunity shock in



























Assuming the symmetric case where expected returns and deposit rates in
countries are the same, then as J increases country investment shares decline
to zero but this limit clearly does not. Hence globabilization aggrevates ﬁckle-
ness. A more diversiﬁed bank in a particular host country will pull assets out
relatively more quickly than a less diversiﬁed one if the host suﬀers a negative
7opportunity shock. Moreover, as β, increases from a low value towards unity,
then the derivative and the limit above become more negative. There is then
an interaction between globalization and positive return correlations. Higher
positive correlations between countries make the ﬁckleness eﬀect of globaliza-
tion worse. Calvo´s original case of independent asset returns was in fact only
a mild version of the problem18.
The literature has also stressed the idea that credit from international banks
may be less sensitive to funding shocks as they have access to a global pool of
liquidity. A rise in funding costs in the host country will reduce the amount
of deposits raised in that country and indeed analogous results to the above
can be obtained to illustrate that the sensitivity of the amount of deposits
raised in a particular country to the funding cost in that country also rises with
globalization. However, of more interest is how an internationally diversiﬁed
bank may adjust its lending portfolio given an increase in funding costs in a
particular host. To analyze this, consider the derivative of θ with respect to



















If funding costs and asset returns within countries are uncorrelated (COVLD =
0), then the derivative is zero and changes in funding costs have absolutely no
eﬀect on the bank´s investment policy19. However, as monetary conditions in
the host vary and exchange rates ﬂuctuate, it is likely that deposit and loan
returns in foreign currency move together. In an extreme case, where asset
returns drop due to widespread loan defaults or intervention by the authorities,
f o r e i g nb a n k sm a ya l s oe x p e c tt h e i rf u n d i n gc o s t st ob el o w e r e di nt h es e n s et h a t
interest payments on deposit obligations might be forcibly reduced20. Hence,
foreign banks may think of the deposits raised in a particular country as a
18The ﬁckleness of globalization is made worse if β2 < 1 which would normally be the case.














19Indeed in this model this is true even if the bank can raise deposits in just two countries
as by assumption the bank faces an elastic supply of funds at the going rate. In a more
general model as a global bank operates in more markets it may ﬁnd it cheaper to increase
funding a little in many markets than more in one or two.
20A recent example is the case of Argentina where dollar assets and deposits were forcibly
converted into local pesos, alebit at diﬀerent exchange rates.
8hedge against the assets that they have in that country. This suggests that
COVLD > 0.I n t e r e s t i n g l y , w e ﬁnd that foreign banks may then not be so









becomes more positive such that increases
in funding costs would lead a foreign diversiﬁed bank to reduce assets in the
host (reduce 1 − θ) more quickly. The intuition is clear, if funding costs rise
then deposits in the host (1−η) will be reduced, the hedge against local assets
is then reduced and the bank will retrench assets more aggressively.
To illustrate these results further, consider the following simulations. Figure
1 plots the elasticity of loans in the home country to the expected return in the
home country [henceforth the "elasticity" and deﬁned as (dθ/ds)∗(sL/(1−θ))]
on the z axis for a set of base parameters, varying the number of countries, J,
and the covariance of asset returns across countries, COV.W i t hCOV =0 ,t h e
negative eﬀect on the elasticity is clearly visible. However, as can be seen there
is an interesting interaction between COV and J. As the covariance between
the countries increases then the globalization eﬀect on ﬁckleness becomes worse.
[Figure 1 Here]
In this base case we set the ρL = sL. But it is also interesting to consider
what happens as sL <ρ L, or in other words, with successive expected return or
opportunity shocks as say the situation in a host country deteriroates. In Figure
2, we plot (dθ/ds)(sL/(1−θ)) on the z axis varying the number of countries, J,
and the initial host country expected return, sL. As can be seen, the potential
deleterious eﬀect of globalization also interacts with the initial level of sL. This
implies that as the situation in the host country deteriorates the eﬀect of is
highly non-linear. A more diversiﬁed bank pulls out faster as expected returns
decline.
[Figure 2 Here]
The above results were obtained from the portfolio model subject to a Basel
I type capital restriction that limits bank leverage. In practice some countries
also place limits on the use of local deposits. For example, one restriction
encountered is that local deposits may only be used to fund local assets 21.
In the following program we then include a second restriction, namely that an
international bank aﬃliate in the host country must have local assets at least
as large as local deposits:
21In Argentina, local banks (national and foreign bank branches and subsidiaries) may only








Subject to : α(1+D) ≤ 1 and (1+D)(1−θ) ≥ D(1−η)
(13)
The constraint implies that the international bank is limited in how much
of its global pool of liquidity it can invest in all countries except the host. In
particular it implies that θ<
1+ηD
1+D . It can be shown that the constraint binds
if the number of countries, J, is above a critical value that depends on the other
parameters:
Jc =
(ρL − sL)+( ρD − sD)+γσ2(1 − β − β2)
(ρL − sL)+( ρD − sD)
(14)
For the base case22, where the expected returns and funding costs are the
equal, the critical value is inﬁnity and hence the constraint never binds. This
must be the case, as the bank would have a symmetric portfolio and the positive
capital of the bank would fund assets in excess of deposits in equal proportion
across all countries. However, if the expected return in the host country declines
then the critical value of countries, Jc, falls quickly. Indeed for the base case,
if the expected return in the host falls to 17.5% (from 20%), then keeping all
the other parameters constant then, Jc =2 .8 such that if J º 3, the constraint
binds. This is the situation we have in mind in what follows. The following









(sL − ρL) − (sD − ρD)











2Jγσ2(1 − β − β2)
(16)
which again does not go to zero as J increases to inﬁnity. The ﬁckleness
eﬀect of globalization then remains. Indeed a diversiﬁed bank will reduce both
deposits and assets in order to comply with the constraint. However computing










(ρL − sL) − (ρD − sD)
(17)
which is negative for (ρD−sD) < (ρL−sL) (eg: in the case of a opportunity
shock where asset returns in the host county have fallen more than deposit
22T h eb a s ec a s eh a sp a r a m e t e r sa sd e t a i l e di nF i g u r e1a n dw i t hCOV =0 .03.
10rates in that country relative to other countries asset returns and deposit rates,
sL <ρ L − (ρD − sD) and which, in contrast to the elasticity in the previous
maximization, P1, does not depend on the covariances. One interpretation
of this result is that although the ﬁckleness eﬀect of globabilization remains,
as the number of countries becomes large, the additional impact of positive
correlations is reduced. Moreover, for the symmetric case where sL = ρL,s D =
ρD and for COVLD =0 ,w eﬁnd a simple expression for the diﬀerence between
the elasticity generated by the ﬁrst maximization, P1, (with only a capital


















(J − 1)sLα(1 − α)
γσ2(1 − α)(2 − α)
(18)
The diﬀerence is clearly negative (for α<1,J >Jc > 1,γ>0), indicating
that while the ﬁckleness eﬀect of globalization remains, the regulation may par-
tially protect a host country. Moreover the diﬀerence depends on J, suggesting
that as globabilization increases the protection provided is greater. It might
be argued then that restricting the use of local funding to purchase local assets
will not protect a country from the eﬀects of globalization per se, as foreign
banks will reduce deposits and assets in the country concerned, but may pro-
vide some protection, especially where globalization has advanced signiﬁcantly
(the relevant foreign banks have invested in many countries) and where asset
returns are positively correlated between those countries23.
In this section we argue that globalization may imply safer banks from the
point of view of aggregate default risk but also banks that may react more
aggressively to bad (or good) news regarding expected returns (opportunity
shocks) in a particular country. We also ﬁnd that this potential instability of
globalization of banking is aggrevated across countries if the correlation between
countries is higher. At the same time, however, and especially if foreign banks
do not consider local host deposits as a hedge against local assets, credit from
foreign banks will be more stable given a funding shock in the country concerned.
Finally, we consider the impact of a restriction on the use of local deposits. We
ﬁnd that this kind of restriction does not protect countries against the potential
deleterious eﬀects of globalization, but it may protect countries from the extra
impact of positively correlated expected returns across countries.
3 Testing the relative stability of foreign vs. do-
23The regulation will also impact on the eﬀect of a funding shock. In general, foreign banks
operating in a host country with this regulation, and where the regulation is binding, may
behave a little more like local banks - both in terms of opportunity and liquidity shocks.
11mestic banks
3.1 The data
Over the 1990´s foreign bank branches and subsidiaries have become increas-
ingly more important as local lenders to Latin America´s private sector. The
data we work with comes from the balance sheets of local ﬁnancial institutions
that report to the appropriate regulatory agency in 11 countries in the region:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Peru and El Salvador and runs from 1993 to 2002 with some diﬀerences
depending on the country. In most countries balance sheets are presented on a
monthly basis. However, we ﬁnd that monthly data is volatile and suspect that
the signal to noise ratio is low and hence we work with quarterly information.
For the purposes of this paper we deﬁne foreign banks as a bank with ownser-
ship of more than 50% from a G10 country24. As shown in table 1, all of the
countries in our sample have such foreign banks. The table depicts the average
number of foreign banks throughout the sample and the share of credit sup-
plied by foreign banks with respect to total credit supplied by privately owned
banks in each country. Our deﬁnition of credit does not include any form of
indirect lending through securities purchases; i.e. it only includes direct lending
by banks25. We do not include public banks in this table nor in the regressions
to follow26.
[Table 1 About Here]
>From table 1, it is clear that there is considerable heterogeneity in Latin
America. The average share of credit from foreign banks is 21% of total credit.
While in Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras the share of foreign bank credit is
particularly low, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Mexico foreign banks
play a very signiﬁcant role in providing credit. In virtually all cases there is
as i g n i ﬁcant increase in loans, deposits and the share of foreign banks during
the 1990´s. As many countries’ economies stagnated during the latter half of
the decade loan growth subsided and in many cases the share of foreign banks
stabilized. In the case of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, we see decreases in
loans towards the end of the sample.
24In some of these countries banks from other countries in the region opperate. For the
purposes of this study we focus on the G1o banks and not regional banks. In tests, not
reported here, we ﬁnd that the regional banks behave more like local banks.
25It is worth noting that in some cases it includes some credit to the public sector and to
other ﬁnancial intermediaries. Ideally we would like to have a precise measure of credit to the
private sector, but this data would only be available for less than half of the countries in the
sample given variations in country deﬁnitions.
26We feel that public bank behaviour is a separate and distinct topic, not to be confused
with the behavior of proﬁt maximizing local or foreign bank.
12The case of Argentina is a particularly interesting one where the share of
foreign banks rose very strongly over the 1990´s with the entry of new foreign
banks purchasing existing large Argentine banks. As the recession kicks in,
in late 1998 through 2000, domestic private banks and foreign banks reduce
credit but, if anything, the latter’s share of lending continues to rise slightly.
Considering deposits, foreign banks clearly increased their share of deposits
over the period including the period leading up to the crisis. In the case of
Brazil, there is an increase in the market share of foreign banks, especially
over 2000-2002, with again the purchase of several domestic instiutions by large
international players. The last few observations show a very rapid decline in
loans of both foreign and domestic banks with foreign banks marginally losing
market share of deposits and loans. The market share of foreign banks in Mexico
and Peru also increased dramatically over the sample with the entry of foreign
banks as they bought domestic banks. Mexico also appears to experience a
slight reduction in the share of foreign loans and deposits at the end of the
sample.
This overview raises an important issue which is that foreign bank entry has
largely taken place through the medium of acquisition rather than start-ups.
Indeed the market share of foreign banks in credit in Mexico or Peru shows
dramatic step jumps as a particular foreign bank acquisition is eﬀected. In
considering the stability of foreign bank intermediation, it is then important
to consider the appropriate treatment of these events. In this study we chose
to control for all acquisitions including foreign purchases and for exits. This
implies that our tests relate to the relative stability of foreign bank credit in-
termediation, conditional on the foreign bank having entered and continuing to
operate in the host country concerned. We discuss this further below.
3.2 Statistical and econometric tests
In this section, we present a set of statistical and econometric tests to attempt
to investigate more precisely whether foreign banks are more or less stable credit
intermediaries, relative to domestic institutions, and in particular whether they
respond to the types of shocks as suggested by the theory. We have data on
all regulated ﬁnancial institutions that report to the relevant banking regulator,
however in our econometric speciﬁcations we restrict our analysis to banks that
have a share of at least 2% of the country’s banking system’s total assets. We
limit the sample in this way, as we suspect that the data quality of the smaller
institutions in some countries is low. Moreover, the heterogeneity of ﬁnancial
institutions tends to increase as size falls. The small ﬁnancial institutions named
as banks in some countries may be performing very diﬀerent roles in diﬀerent
locations. Credit from these institutions constitute a very small share of total
credit, and that credit tends to exhibit large variations over a small base, simply
reducing the power of our tests or even biasing the results27.Our interest is a
27We also ran many of the speciﬁcations using the complete sample. Our results are similar
to those obtained using the restricted sample, and are available upon request.
13comparison between the larger and more comparable domestic and the larger
foreign banks within host countries28.
In each country we investigated the major mergers and acquisitions. Our
rule was that each acquired (or merged) bank becomes a new bank in our data.
This includes foreign banks too. When a foreign bank enters a country by
purchasing an existing bank we deﬁne the purchased bank as a new one. In
all of the statistics and tests reported we drop the observations where a new
institution appears. Hence we drop from the sample, observations of entry, exit
and major mergers and acquisitions. Our statistics and tests are conducted
on changes in credit and hence the change is calculated only where the "same
institution" existed in both periods to calculate the relevant ﬁrst diﬀerence.
Hence our tests are conditional on the foreign bank having entered and having
not exited. This we feel gives the fairest picture of actual changes in credit
intermediation.
In Table 2, we present the unconditional volatility of credit growth in each
country on a quarterly basis considering the non-weighted, restricted sample.
We ﬁnd that, credit from foreign banks is more volatile than that of domestic
institutions in virtually all cases. In the cases of Bolivia, Chile, Honduras and
El Salvador the diﬀerences are more pronounced than in the other countries
where the ﬁgures are similar.
[Table 2 About Here]
However these unconditional standard deviations tell us only a limited amount.
For example, it may be that foreign banks increase credit more strongly than
domestic ones. Moreover, here we do not test statistical signiﬁcance; nor do
we control for bank speciﬁc factors nor country common time eﬀects that may
aﬀect these statistics.
Moreover, the theory developed above tells us that foreign banks may re-
spond more to some types of shocks but less to others. In particular, the theory
suggests that foreign banks may respond less to shocks that aﬀect deposits (as
foreign banks are perceived as safer and can shift from traditional domestic
ﬁnancing to other sources of funding more easily than domestic institutions),
but may respond more to shocks that aﬀect expected returns in host countries.
One way to consider these diﬀerential impacts of diﬀerent shocks is to analyze
the behaviour of the diﬀerent types of institutions in diﬀerent scenarios corre-
sponding to positive and negative shocks to “opportunities” and positive and
negative shocks to deposits or the supply of domestic funds which we refer to
as "liquidity " shocks.
In the following 2*2 matrix, we then depict four scenarios depending on
whether total credit in a particular country is growing or contracting and
w h e t h e rd e p o s i t sa r eg r o w i n gf a s t e ro rs l o w e rt h a nc r e d i t .I nt h eﬁrst quadrant
28In some speciﬁcations, we also weight each bank obervation by the relative size in the
banking system of that institution.
14(NW), credit is growing and is growing faster than deposits. In this situation we
expect to see credit growing mostly because proﬁtable investment opportunities
are available rather than because new funds might be entering the system. This
we refer to as a positive opportunity shock and our hypothesis, following the
theory outlined in the ﬁrst section, is that foreign banks would increase credit
faster than their domestic counterparts. The second (NE) quadrant corresponds
to a positive liquidity shock. Here credit is growing but not as fast as domestic
deposits. The growth of credit, as opposed to the ﬁr s tq u a d r a n ti sn o td r i v e n
by proﬁtable opportunities but rather by the expansion of available funds. Here
we would expect foreign bank credit to expand less fast than the credit of their
domestic counterparts. The third quadrant (SW) represents the classic deposit
crunch where credit is falling, but deposits are falling faster. Here we would
expect foreign banks’ credit to be falling less quickly than that of domestic
banks. Finally, in quadrant four (SE), we have credit falling and falling faster
than deposits. We refer to this as the negative opportunity shock and again
we would expect foreign banks’ credit to be falling faster than that of domestic
banks during this scenario.
[Figure 3: Matrix of Opportunity versus Liquidity Shocks]
Using our data set, we then divide our sample into these four quadrants and
track the change in the share of credit of each type of bank29. We then aggregate
across all banks and countries and present the results in Table 3 in terms of the
change in the share of each type of bank during each quarter in our sample, with
the quarters classiﬁed into the four quadrants as indicated. The results need
to be interpreted with respect to the other quadrants rather than in absolute
value. With this in mind, it is worth noting that the results tend to follow the
theoretical predictions with the foreign bank share rising more in quadrants 1
and 3 (Positive Opportunity Shock and Negative Liquidity Shock) with respect
to the other two quadrants. In quadrants 2 and 4 (Positive Liquidity Shock and
Negative Opportunity Shock), credit rises less. Quadrant 2 shows a contraction
in the foreign bank’s share, and for quadrant 4 the change in the share of foreign
banks is zero to two decimal places. Perhaps of most interest, is that the largest
change in share occurs with the Negative Liquidity Shock where foreign banks
increase their market share by some 0.12% per quarter on average when credit
falls and deposits fall faster than credit.
[Table 3 Here]
29Country aggregated deposits and loans are de-meaned and their growth rates are com-
puted using the ﬁltered versions of these variables. We do this since it is not obvious whether
the quadrants should be deﬁned with credit falling or growing or growing faster or slower than
the average growth rate of credit in the country concerned. This procedure is used throughout
the paper. Results using non de-meaned deposits and loans to classify countries in quadrants
do not vary signiﬁcantly and are available on request.
15However, these statistics are essentially descriptive and hence, we turn to
more formal econometric tests. Following the idea that foreign banks may re-
spond diﬀerently to domestic banks depending on the nature of the shocks, we
conduct a series of regressions that attempt to test whether foreign banks be-
have diﬀerently under the four diﬀerent scenarios. We note that this technique
side-steps the endemic problems of endogeneity and identiﬁcation that tend to
plague this type of analysis. For example, a regression of credit on the under-
lying economic variables such as GDP, economic activity, country risk, interest
rates, country rating together with bank deposits is subject to the standard
criticism that these variables may not be exogenous to bank credit or to bank
deposits. Thus using such regressions to test whether foreign banks bring sta-
bility or not tends to be problematic. We use the overall annual movement
of credit and deposits in each country to identify the type of shock: opportu-
nity shock (positive or negative) and liquidity shock (positive and negative).
Apart from telling us about statistical signiﬁcance levels, the results may also
diﬀer from the tables above due to the set of further controls that we introduce.
First, we control for time eﬀects to ensure our results are not driven by some
other systemic event. Second, as we have eleven countries we allow the time
dummies to also diﬀe ra c r o s sc o u n t r i e ss oi ne f e f c tw eh a v ec o u n t r y - t i m ee ﬀects.
Third, we conduct unweighted and weighted regressions where the regression
weights depend on the relative size of each banks in total country bank assets.
Fourth, we use speciﬁcations with and without bank ﬁxed eﬀects. Formally, we
estimate the following regression:
∆loansijt = α1∆loansijt + α2∆loansijt ∗ Foreignij (19)
+α3I
∆l−∆d>0
jt ∗ Foreignij + α4Foreignij + µjt +  ijt
where ∆loansijt is the quarterly growth rates of bank i’s loans, in country
j in period t,Foreignij is a dummy variable taking value of 1 when the bank
is owned by a G10 bank (otherwise it is zero), µjt is a country quarter eﬀect,
and I
∆l−∆d>0
jt an indicator variable taking value of 1 when country wide credit
is growing faster than deposits and −1 in the opposite case. An interaction
between the bank being foreign owned and the I
∆l−∆d>0
jt indicator variable,
is the relevant term for our purposes, and it refers to the ﬁr s t( N W )a n dt h e
third (SW) quadrants of the 2 ∗ 2 matrix above. A test on the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient of this interaction term, then indicates whether foreign banks
behave diﬀerently under the scenario of either a positive opportunity shock or a
negative liquidity shock. In both scenarios, we would expect that foreign banks
increase their share of credit relative to domestic banks. The coeﬃcient on the
foreign bank dummy in the speciﬁcation above captures any possible trend in
foreign banks that is not present in privately owned domestic ones across the
four scenarios. The coeﬃcient on the interaction indicates changes relative to
such speciﬁc behavior of foreign banks when aggegate loans grow more than
16aggregate deposits or viceversa. We also include a lagged dependent variable to
allow for loan dynamics30, and also include an interaction between the lagged
dependent variable and the foreign property dummy to allow the possibility that
dynamics may be diﬀerent for foreign banks.
Table 4 presents several results based on the speciﬁcation above. In the
ﬁrst column we include country time eﬀects only and do not use weights in
the estimation. We have 3673 observations and ﬁnd the interaction variable
to be signiﬁcant, at the 1% level. This means that foreign banks gain market
share during periods of positive opportunity shocks or negative liquidity shocks,
relative to domestic privately owned banks and lose market share in the case of
negative opportunity shocks and positive liquidity shocks. In this regression the
dummy on foreign banks (without the interaction terms) captures the trend in
foreign bank share. Our results suggest that foreign bank credit growth exhibits
a trend that is statistically diﬀerent than that of domestic institutionas31.M o r e
importantly, the results support the theory presented in the model in section
2: Foreign banks gain market share during positive "opportunity shocks" and
"negative liquidity shocks".
In columns 2-4 we perform the same regression but weighting the regres-
sion (column 2), including bank ﬁxed eﬀects (column 3) and both weighting
the regression and with bank ﬁxed eﬀects (column 4). The results do not
change. Column 4 represents the most robust version where the regression (a)
is weighted, (b) includes bank ﬁxed eﬀects and (c) includes country quarterly
time eﬀects. We continue to ﬁnd that the foreign bank interaction eﬀect is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient is 0.009, such that the regression
suggests that, whenever credit is growing faster than deposits (either due to
a negative liquidity shock or a positive opportunity shock), on average foreign
bank credit grew 0.9% more than domestic bank credit per quarter and when
credit grows less fast than deposits (positive liquidity shock or negative oppor-
tunity shock), foreign bank credit grew 0.9% slower than that of national banks.
In columns 3 and 4 we drop the foreign bank dummy as we include bank ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Finally columns 5-8 report a similar regression, but instead of using an in-
dicator dummy to capture each quadrant, we use the actual diﬀerence between
loan growth and deposits growth. Again the results are similar to those reported
in the ﬁrst group of columns, supporting the view that foreign banks follow dif-
ferential behavior with respect to domestic ones when diﬀerent types of shocks
hit the economy. When both the indicator function and the actual diﬀerence
between loan and deposit growth are included only the frmer s signiﬁcant, sug-
gesting that the indicator functions best captures the diﬀerent scenarios. This
30Given the size of our sample, our estimations do not require using dynamic panel tech-
niques such as Arellano and Bond (1991). Judson and Owen (1999) show that for samples with
more than 20 periods, these techniques are not necessary to correcting the bias of including a
lagged dependent variable.
31This result is not however signiﬁcant at standard levels across all speciﬁcations.
17implies that the four scenarios employed do appear to be more like changes in
regime than a continuous set of possibilities.
[Table 4 About Here]
In these regressions we not distinguish between the opportunity and liquid-
ity shocks, we only show that relative to domestic banks, foreign banks growth
faster during positive opportunity shocks and/or negative liquidity shocks but
we do not diﬀerenciate between these two shocks . In other words, while we
distinguish between whether aggregate deposits are either growing faster or
slower than credit, we did not distinguish between positive and negative credit
growth. In the following regression results, presented in Table 5, we distin-
guish both types of shocks. We do this by adding an additional term to the
regression above. In particular, we add an indicator dummy to characterize
liquidity shocks. We deﬁne a "liquidity shock" indicator variable which takes
on the value of 1 if aggregate deposits (country wide) are growing and growing
faster than credit (positive deposit shock) and −1 if deposits are shrinking and
shrinking faster than credit (negative deposit shock). In the previous set of
regressions (table 4) we were able to identify that foreign banks react diﬀerently
to possitive opportunity shocks and negative liquidity shocks (quadrants 1 and
3) with respect to negative opportunity shocks and positive liquidity shocks. By
adding the additional interaction them in the regression we are able to identify
if there is a diﬀerential eﬀect between the impact of the positive opportunity
shock and the negative deposit shock. To do so, we formally estimate:





jt ∗ Foreign ij + α5Foreignijt + µjt +  ijt (20)
where I
∆l>0&∆l−∆d<0
jt indicates periods when liquidity shocks are present.
[Table 5 About Here]
The ﬁrst column then reports a regression (unweighted and without bank
ﬁxed eﬀects but with a country- quarterly time eﬀect) of the percentage change
in credit of bank i on the foreign bank dummy, interaction terms between this




jt as described above,
and the lagged dependent variable and its interaction with the foreign dummy.
We ﬁnd that the additional (second) interaction term is not signiﬁcant. This
suggests that there is no evidence of a diﬀerential eﬀect between opportunity
shocks and liquidity shocks. In other words, we cannot distinguish statistcially
between the magnitude of the impact of a positive (negative) opportunity shock
and a negative (positive) liquidity shock in regards to the response of foreign
18banks. However a joint signiﬁcance test on the coeﬃcients α3 and α4 as reported
in the F test in the bottom of the table, shows that they are statistically diﬀerent
from zero, suggesting that there is clearly a diﬀerential impact between foreign
and domestically owned banks - as also suggested by table 4. This result holds
throughout all speciﬁcations.
An alternative way to test if opportunity shocks and liquidity shocks have
diﬀerential eﬀects is to deﬁne indicator variables for each type of shock sep-
arately and test the signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients. Formally we
deﬁne a new indicator variable to capture opportunity shocks which we label
I
∆l>0&∆l−∆d>0
jt .This indicator variable takes values 1 when aggregate loans are
growing and grow faster than deposits (positive opportunity shock) and -1 when
aggregate loans are falling and fall faster than deposits. Formally we estimate
the following equation:
loansijt = α1∆loansijt + α2∆loansijt ∗ Foreignij + α3I
∆l>0&∆l−∆d>0
jt ∗ Foreign ij
+α4I
∆l>0&∆l−∆d<0
jt ∗ Foreignij + α5Foreign ijt + µjt +  ijt (21)
where a3 is the coeﬃcient on the interaction of the foreign bank dummy and
the opportunity shock indicator and a4 is the coeﬃcient on the interaction of the
foreign bank dummy and the liquidity shock indicator. According to the theory
depicted above we would expect a3 to be positive and signiﬁcant, implying that
foreign banks are more sensitive to opportunity shocks than domestic banks,
and a4 to be negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that foreign banks are less
sensitive than domestic banks to liquidity shocks. A test on a3 = −a4 indicates
if there is a diﬀerential eﬀect between both types of shocks.
Table 6 presents the results of these estimations. Column 1 presents esti-
mations without weights and without bank ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 2 reports the
results including weights, and columns 3 and 4 replicate 1 and 2 including bank
ﬁxed eﬀects. The results are virtually the same across speciﬁcations. Both the
interactions of the foreign bank dummy with the liquidity and the opportunity
shock indicators are signiﬁcant and with the signs as suggested by theory. We
cannot reject the hypothesis that foreign banks react diﬀerently to these diﬀer-
ent shocks relative to domestic banks. In absolute values, the coeﬃcient on the
liquidity shock is higher than that of the opportunity shock indicator, nonethe-
less the test on a3 = −a4 reported in the table suggests that we cannot reject
that the impact of each type of shock is the same.
[Table 6 About Here]
19To summarise the methodology and results, as motivated by the theory and
given the serious problems of endogeneity that plague standard regressions in
this area, we employ aggregate movements in credit and deposits in each country
to identify four scenarios related to opportunity and liquidty shocks. We then
analyze the relative behavior of foreign and domestic banks in these diﬀerent
scenarios. Considering unconditional changes in market share (controlling for
entry, mergers and acquisitions and exit), we ﬁnd that the changes in market
share follow those as expected by the theory. In particular, we ﬁnd that foreign
banks tend to increase market share when there is a negative liquidity shock
or a positive opportunity shock and decrease market share when there is a
negative opportunity shock or positive funding shock. We ﬁn dt h es a m er e s u l t s
when we model those changes in market share using regression analyses. These
results are robust to including bank speciﬁc and country-time speciﬁc dummies
a n dw h e t h e rw er u nu n w e i g h t e do rw e i g h t e dr e g r e s s i o n s . M o r e o v e r ,w eﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the size of the response of foreign banks to a
negative (positive) liquidity shock and a positive (negative) opportunity shock:
in both cases the market share of foreign banks in credit increases (decreases).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have suggested that playing host to foreign banks may imply
at r a d e - o ﬀ. The theoretical model expounded, suggests that well diversiﬁed
foreign banks may be less sensitive to liquidity shocks. As such banks may
be viewed as safer by depositors and hence less prone to deposit runs and if
deposit runs do occur then their access to a global pool of liquidity may imply
more stable credit formation. This result is qualiﬁed if foreign banks consider
local deposits in a host country as a hedge against local assets in that coun-
try. On the other hand, we have found a ﬁckleness eﬀect of globabilization
such that a well diversiﬁed foreign bank may increase (or decrease) its assets
more aggresively in a particular country if that country suﬀers a positive (neg-
ative) oppportunity (expected return) shock. Moreover, the ﬁckleness eﬀect of
globalization appears to be exaccerbated by positively correlated asset returns
across countries. Finally, we ﬁnd that although imposing a regulation that
local deposits must be used to fund local assets may protect countries partially,
especially in cases where foreign banks operate in a large number of countries
and asset returns are positively correlated, it does not protect countries against
the basic eﬀect of globabilization on ﬁkcleness.
In order to test these ﬁndings empricially, and taking into account the very
serious problems of endogeneity in standard regression analyses, we used the
change in aggregate credit and total deposits in each of eleven countries to deﬁne
periods corresponding to positive and negative "opportunity" and "funding"
shocks. The hypothesis from the theory is then that foreign banks will increase
(decrease) their market share relative to domestic banks when there is a negative
(positive) liquidity shock or a positive (negative) opportunity shock. We did
20indeed ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Moreover, we found
that we could not distinguish between the magnitude of the negaitve (positive)
liquidity shock and a positive (negative) liquidity shock.
These results have some strong policy conclusions. Host countries should be
aware that inviting foreign banks to enter, may bring rewards in terms of greater
stability with respect to shocks that aﬀect funding costs in a host country but
potential costs in terms of instability in the face of host opportunity shocks.
Moreover, we have found that rules limiting the use of domestic deposits to
fund only domestic assets aﬀord limited protection in theory. Some authors
have suggested that foreign banks may act as a lender of last resort for their
hosts - see for example Calvo and Mendoza (2000b). Our results support this
view, to some extent, considering the results regarding liquidity shocks however
the results on opportunity shocks illustrate that foreign banks should certainly
not be considered as credit-intermediation stabilizers under all circumstances.
If shocks aﬀect expected returns, then local credit intermediation with global
banks may be more and not less, volatile. A preliminary conclusion is then
that a judicious combination of domestic and foriegn banks may be an optimum
for host countries such that there is not too much exposure to the volatility of
foreign banks in the face of opportunity shocks nor the volatiltiy of domestic
institutions when confronted with liqudity shocks.
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226T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
Quarter Domestic Foreign
ARG 28 Share 45% 55%
Avg. Banks 55.6 28.2
BOL 31 Share 97% 3%
Avg. Banks 14.5 1.0
BRA 36 Share 67% 33%
Avg. Banks 129.8 51.6
CHL 35 Share 61% 39%
Avg. Banks 16.9 13.3
COL 31 Share 80% 20%
Avg. Banks 22.2 8.2
CRI 34 Share 92% 8%
Avg. Banks 19.0 2.0
GTM 34 Share 97% 3%
Avg. Banks 29.0 2.0
HND 34 Share 98% 2%
Avg. Banks 18.9 2.0
MEX 36 Share 72% 28%
Avg. Banks 15.9 14.6
PER 40 Share 68% 32%
Avg. Banks 13.2 7.1
SLV 34 Share 93% 7%
Avg. Banks 11.7 2.3
All Share 79% 21%
Total Bank obsv 11731 4490
Table 1: Share of Credit in Domestic and Foreign 
Banks
Source: Bank Superintendencies of Latin America                                        
Notes: Foreign banks are defined as banks with at least 50% of foreign 








Costa Rica 7.9% 10.3%





Source: Bank Superintendencies of Latin America. Notes: Foreign 
banks are defined as banks with at least 50% of foreign ownership 
from G10 countries. State owned banks  are not included in the 
sample. Only private banks with asset share larger than 2% of the 
system's assets are included.
Table 2: Standard Deviation of Credit Growth
Table 3: Change in the Loans Share of Foreign Banks (in percentage points)
-number of quarters in each quadrant-





∆% Credit > 0
∆% Credit < 0
Source: Bank Superintendencies of Latin America. Notes: Foreign banks are defined as banks with at least 50% 
of foreign ownership from G10 countries. State owned banks  are not included in the sample. Only private banks 
with asset share larger than 2% of the system's assets are included. 
24Dependent Variable: ∆ log(loansijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ log(loansijt-1) 0.293 0.267 0.210 0.201 0.295 0.266 0.206 0.195
(0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)***
∆ log(loansijt-1) * Foreignij -0.196 -0.181 -0.210 -0.221 -0.205 -0.180 -0.221 -0.225
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)***
I(∆loans - ∆dep >0)jt  * Foreignij 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.009
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
(∆loans - ∆dep >0)jt  * Foreignij 0.139 0.096 0.149 0.094
(0.049)*** (0.045)** (0.056)*** (0.053)*
Foreignijt 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.003)
Observations 3673 3673 3673 3673 3434 3434 3434 3434
R-squared 0.3254 0.3954 0.3966 0.4535 0.3262 0.3923 0.4046 0.4564
Country Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Weight No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: I(Dloans - Ddep>0) is an indicator variable taking value 1 when aggregate credit - aggregate deposits are positive and -1 otherwise. Mergers as well as changes 
in ownership as considered as new banks. Only banks accounting for more than 2% of the banking system's total assets in the initial period are included. State owned 
banks are not included in the sample.
Table 4: Foreign and Domestic Banks Behavior under Positive Opportunity Shocks and Negative 
Liquidity Shocks
Dependent Variable: ∆ log(loansijt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log(loansijt-1) 0.291 0.267 0.208 0.200
(0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)***
∆ log(loansijt-1) * Foreignij -0.193 -0.180 -0.206 -0.218
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
I(∆loans - ∆dep >0)jt  * Foreignij 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.004)**
I(∆loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep <0)jt  * Foreignij -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreignij 0.006 0.005
(0.003)* (0.003)*
Observations 3673 3673 3673 3673
R-squared 0.3255 0.3954 0.3967 0.4536
CQ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B FE No No Yes Yes
Weight No Yes No Yes
Test (Prob > F) on joint signif. of interactions 0.0043 0.0078 0.0067 0.0113
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: I(∆loans - ∆dep>0) is an indicator variable taking value 1 when aggregate credit growth - aggregate deposits growth 
is positive and -1 otherwise.  I(∆loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep<0)  is an indicator variable taking value 1 when deposits are 
growing and are growing more than credit, and -1 when deposits are falling and are falling more than credit.Mergers as well 
as changes in ownership as considered as new banks.
Table 5: Foreign and Domestic Banks Behavior under Positive Opportunity 
Shocks and Negative Liquidity Shocks including Liquidity Shocks 
Interaction
25Dependent Variable: ∆ log(loansijt)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
∆ log(loansijt-1) 0.291 0.267 0.208 0.200
(0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)***
∆ log(loansijt-1) * Foreignij -0.193 -0.180 -0.206 -0.218
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
I(∆loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep >0)jt  * Foreignij    a 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)* (0.004)**
I(∆loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep <0)jt  * Foreignij     b -0.012 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011
(0.005)** (0.005)* (0.006)** (0.005)**
Foreignij 0.006 0.005
(0.003)* (0.003)*
Observations 3673 3673 3673 3673
R-squared 0.3255 0.3954 0.3967 0.4536
CQ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B FE No No Yes Yes
Weight No Yes No Yes
Test (Prob > F) on   a = -b 0.5148 0.8826 0.3265 0.5503
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: I(∆ loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep>0) is an indicator variable taking value 1 when loans are growing and growing more 
than deposits, and -1 when loans are shrinking and shrinking more than deposits.I(∆loans>0 & ∆loans - ∆dep<0)  is an 
indicator variable taking value 1 when deposits are growing and are growing more than credit, and -1 when deposits are 
falling and are falling more than credit.Mergers as well as changes in ownership as considered as new banks.
Table 6: Foreign and Domestic Banks Behavior under Opportunity and 
Liquidity Shocks
26Figure 1: Positive Correlations Exacerbate the 























Parameters: ρL=sL =0.2, α=0.08, σ=σD= 0.3, γ=0.75, r = 0.1, ρD=sD =0.0, COVLD =0.0
Figure 2: Fickleness Increases with Successive Opportunity Shocks 
 




















27Figure 3: 2x2 Matrix of Opportunity and Liquidity Shocks
∆ Credit - ∆ Deposits > 0 ∆ Credit - ∆ Deposits < 0
∆ Credit > 0
Positive Opportunity Shock  
Foreign Banks (+)
Positive Liquidity Shock        
Foreign Banks (-)
∆ Credit < 0
Negative Liquidity Shock  
Foreign Banks (+)
Negative Opportunity Shock   
Foreign Banks (-)
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